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Amici curiae submit this brief in support of the Commissioner urging the
Court to affirm the Tax Court’s judgment.1
IDENTITY OF AMICI, INTRODUCTION, AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Amici are Roger Colinvaux, John Echeverria, John Leshy, Nancy
McLaughlin, and Janet Milne, all professors who teach tax, nonprofit, property,
land use, or natural resources law and have taught, lectured, and written about
conservation easements. Based on their professional knowledge and personal
experience, they believe allowing a charitable deduction for the easement in this
case would be contrary to the plain language of the statute, the legislative history,
and the Treasury regulations, and would open the door to abusive transactions that
would produce little or no conservation benefit at significant cost to taxpayers.
Amici file this brief to highlight arguments that powerfully support the
Commissioner and to bring broader legal and policy issues to the Court’s attention.
The Belks claimed a $10.5 million charitable deduction under § 170(h) of
the Internal Revenue Code for donating a conservation easement to a land trust
even though the easement permits development of the land ostensibly protected by
the easement. Specifically, the easement allows the parties to engage in
1

No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief, and no party, party’s
counsel, or other person besides Amici and their counsel contributed money to
fund preparation or submission of this brief. No disclosure statement is required
by Rule 26.1.
1

“substitutions” or “swaps” i.e, to release land from the easement restrictions in
exchange for placing easement restrictions on some other land—subject to certain
conditions of the parties’ choosing. The Commissioner appropriately disallowed
the deduction, contending that easements that can “float” across the landscape at
the parties’ discretion violate the requirements of § 170(h) and the regulations.
The Tax Court affirmed the Commissioner, agreeing that § 170(h) requires that a
deductible use restriction relate to a particular parcel and not be allowed to float
from parcel to parcel.
Amici endorse the Tax Court’s position. Section 170(h) allows a deduction
for the donation of an easement that places perpetual restrictions on the use of the
specific property that is the subject of the easement at the time of its donation. The
legislative history and regulations confirm that the perpetual restrictions must
apply to “the interest in the property retained by the donor.” S. Rep. No. 96-1007,
C.B. 599, at 605 (1980-82); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1). There is one narrow
exception: easement restrictions on the original property can be extinguished and
replaced with restrictions on other property if changed conditions make
“impossible or impractical” continued use of the original property for conservation
purposes, the extinguishment is approved by a court, and the holder receives at
least a minimum proportionate share of proceeds from the subsequent sale or
exchange of the original property. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6). The
2

substitutions authorized by the Belk easement, which involve the extinguishment
and replacement of restrictions, do not fit within this exception. Accordingly, the
easement is not eligible for a charitable deduction.
Furthermore, the Belks’ position, if accepted, would undermine the
conservation utility of easements and waste taxpayer dollars by granting the parties
broad discretion to lift easement restrictions off properties whenever they constrain
development, leading to the destruction of the conservation values identified as
worthy of protection when the easements were donated. It also would be
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for the Commissioner to police whether
post-donation “substitutions” involve interests in land with equivalent financial and
conservation values.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Internal Revenue Code, Legislative History, and Treasury
Regulations Confirm that Floating Easements Are Not Entitled to
Federal Tax Subsidies.
A party challenging a determination by the Commissioner to disallow a tax

deduction bears the burden of showing the Commissioner erred. Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). Any reasonable reading of the Internal
Revenue Code, the pertinent legislative history, and the regulations shows that a
taxpayer is not entitled to a deduction for an easement that can “float.”
Therefore, the Tax Court’s ruling should be affirmed.
3

A. The Statute
The plain language of § 170(h) contradicts the Belks’ theory. To constitute
a “qualified conservation contribution” under § 170(h)(1), the contribution must be
(A) of “a qualified real property interest,” (B) to “a qualified organization,” and
(C) “exclusively for conservation purposes.” The main issue in this case is
whether the Belks made a contribution of “a qualified real property interest.”2 The
Belks contended that they met the qualified real property interest requirement
because they contributed “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which
may be made of the real property.” § 170(h)(2)(C). The Tax Court correctly
rejected this position.
By requiring that a contribution constitute “a qualified real property
interest,” in the form of “a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may
be made of the real property” (emphases added), § 170(h)(2)(C) indicates that an
easement donation must place permanent legal restrictions on the use of a specific
property, not simply any property. Use of the word “a” in the phrase “a qualified
real property interest” as well as in the phrase “a restriction” naturally suggests a
restriction on a specific stick in the bundle of sticks associated with a specific
2

While it was uncontested that the Belks’ contribution was made to a
“qualified organization,” the Commissioner disputed that the contribution was
made “exclusively for conservation purposes.” The Tax Court did not consider
that issue. See Belk v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 1, 8 n.12 (2013). Amici agree that the
Belks’ contribution also violated that requirement.
4

parcel of property. More to the point, use of the word “the” in § 170(h)(2)(C)
indicates that the donation of the qualified real property interest must ensure
perpetual protection of the specific property on which the donor placed the
easement. If Congress had wished to adopt the Belks’ position—that the
restriction need not relate to a specific parcel—it would have omitted “the,” or it
might have substituted the word “any” for the word “the.” But Congress did
neither. Instead, it used language indicating that a deduction is available only for
perpetual restrictions fixed to “the” specific parcel of land.
Other language in § 170(h) bolsters this plain meaning of § 170(h)(2)(C).
Section 170(h)(1)(C) requires that the contribution be “exclusively for
conservation purposes.” Section 170(h)(5)(A) defines “exclusively for
conservation purposes” in part, by stating that a “contribution shall not be treated
as exclusively for conservation purposes unless the conservation purpose is
protected in perpetuity.” Reading § 170(h)(2)(C) and § 170(h)(5)(A) together, a
taxpayer is eligible for a deduction only if the restrictions on use are perpetually
affixed to a specific property in order to achieve a permanent conservation goal.
The legislative history and regulations, discussed below, also confirm this reading.
Both provide that the perpetual restrictions must apply to the specific property
retained by the donor at the time of the donation.
5

The Belks seek to rebut this straightforward reading of § 170(h) by pointing
out that the regulations authorize extinguishment of conservation easements in the
event of changed circumstances. (Belk Brief, at 20). They argue that the authority
to extinguish an easement in the event of impossibility or impracticality precludes
the conclusion that § 170(h) requires perpetual protection of specific property. But
the extinguishment regulation does not contradict the statute. It simply reflects the
practical reality that continuing to protect the conservation values of a property
will sometimes become impossible or impractical due to changed conditions, that
the easement will be subject to extinguishment by a court in such circumstances,
and that a mechanism was needed to protect the public investment in this
unfortunate (and rare) eventuality. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).
For comparison, under the contract law doctrine of impossibility, the
obligation to carry out a contract is excused if performance becomes impossible.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (1981). But the fact that contract
obligations may be excused under the doctrine of impossibility does not mean that
contracts are unenforceable absent impossibility. Just as the reality of
impossibility can be read into the law of contracts without destroying the sanctity
of contract obligations in general, so too impossibility can be read into § 170(h)
without destroying the requirement that only donations of easements that
permanently protect specific properties qualify for a deduction.
6

B. Legislative History
1. Senate Report
The legislative history of § 170(h) supports this reading of the statute. The
Senate Finance Committee Report on the Tax Treatment Extension Act of 1980
provides detailed guidance on what Congress intended when it adopted § 170(h) in
1980. S. Rep. No. 96-1007, C.B. 599 (1980-82). It states that a deductible
conservation easement “must involve legally enforceable restrictions on the
interest in the property retained by the donor that would prevent uses of the
retained interest inconsistent with the conservation purposes.” Id. at 605
(emphasis added). The report’s explicit reference to restrictions on “the interest in
the property retained by the donor” indicates that the committee contemplated that
taxpayers would be eligible for deductions for placing restrictions on specific
property, not simply any land.
Other passages from the report reinforce the conclusion that Congress
intended to allow deductions only for permanent restrictions attached to specific
property. The report explains that the committee intended to subsidize easement
donations that would “further significant conservation goals without presenting
significant potential for abuse.” Id. at 603. As discussed in more detail below,
allowing the parties to move easements across the landscape in unregulated and
unsupervised transactions would open the door to widespread abuse, contrary to
7

Congress’s intent.
The committee report also emphasizes that strict standards apply when
determining the types of properties eligible for conservation tax subsidies,
standards that would be seriously eroded if easements could “float” from parcel to
parcel. The report states that “deductions for conservation easements should be
directed at the preservation of unique or otherwise significant land areas or
structures.” Id. at 603. To ensure that only qualifying easements receive
deductions, the committee expressed its “expectation” that taxpayers could obtain
“prior administrative determination[s]” on whether their donations would qualify.
Id. at 605. Such determinations are based on detailed analyses of the attributes of
the specific properties that will be the subject of the easements. See, e.g., I.R.S.
P.L.R. 200836014 (Sept. 5, 2008). The committee also said it expected Treasury
to make publication of regulations interpreting § 170(h) a “highest priority.” S.
Rep. No. 96-1007, C.B. 599, at 605 (1980-82). These expressions of concern
about the need to ensure that only eligible conservation easements protecting
specific properties receive tax subsidies would have been nonsensical if the
committee contemplated that the parties could, after the initial donations, move the
restrictions across the landscape at their discretion.
Finally, the committee’s instructions regarding the narrow circumstances in
which a donee may transfer an easement confirm that Congress did not intend to
8

authorize deductions for easements that permit “substitutions.” Substitutions
involve the transfer of some or all of the easement restrictions back to the donor or
subsequent owner of the land in exchange for replacement restrictions on some
other land. However, the report states that deductions should be limited to
easements that “require that the donee (or successor in interest) hold the
conservation easement … exclusively for conservation purposes.” Id. at 606. The
report explains that a qualified organization that receives an easement donation
should be permitted to transfer the easement only to another qualified organization,
and only so long as the transferee organization “also will hold the perpetual
restriction … exclusively for conservation purposes.” Id. These instructions make
it clear that the committee did not intend for donees to have the power to freely
transfer easements back to the donors or subsequent property owners through
swaps.
2. Extinguishment
The legislative history regarding when a perpetual easement might be
extinguished further highlights that deductible easements must be linked to specific
properties. Congress was aware that, in rare cases, circumstances might change so
dramatically that it becomes impossible or impractical for an easement to continue
to serve the purposes for which it was donated and, in such cases, a court could
extinguish the easement. In anticipation of a congressional hearing on proposed
9

§ 170(h), the Joint Committee on Taxation prepared a report that raised the issue of
whether § 170(h) ought to include rules to cover the situation “where a transferred
partial interest in real property, for which a deduction was allowed because it
served a conservation purpose, ceases to be used in furtherance of the conservation
purpose.” See Staff of J. Comm. on Taxation, 96th Cong., Description of Misc.
Tax Bills Scheduled for Hearing before Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of
Comm. on Ways & Means June 26, 1980, JCS-33-80, at 27 (Comm. Print 1980).
In response to this report, the president of a land trust, on behalf of nineteen land
trusts, provided the following testimony:
A question raised in the Joint Committee Description . . . is: should
rules be provided to take care of the remote contingency that at some
time in the future a property subject to a conservation easement might
cease to be used for that conservation purpose?
We believe that with a well-planned easement program this is most
unlikely to occur, but it is not impossible. It is conceivable for
example, that a farm, or a natural habitat, might become so closely
surrounded by heavy industry at some future time that it would
become impossible to continue the original conservation purpose. In
the such situation the then owner of the land might, under common
law “change of circumstances” doctrine, obtain equitable relief from
the burden of the easement in court. Certainly if that were to happen
equity would seem to call for a return to the public of the price
originally paid for the public benefit provided by the easement,
whether that price had been paid directly by purchase or indirectly by
a tax deduction. It also seems very difficult, however, to provide for
this unlikely occurrence in the Revenue Code itself. We would hope
that some Regulation for this purpose could be developed by those
most interested, i.e., The Revenue Service and the Treasury
Department, which would not interfere with the main operation of the
easement program.
10

Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 245 (1980) (statement of Samuel
Morris, President, French and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust). Congress
accepted the advice offered in this testimony and did not include standards and
procedures governing extinguishment of conservation easements in light of
changed circumstances in § 170(h), leaving it to Treasury to address the issue in
regulations. Treasury did so by incorporating a version of the doctrine of cy pres
into the regulations. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6); Kaufman v. Comm’r, 136
T.C. No. 13, *9 (2011), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Kaufman v.
Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012).
The critical point for present purposes is that Congress carefully considered
how best to address the “unlikely occurrence” of extinguishment of a conservation
easement in the event its purpose becomes impossible due to changed conditions.
This precludes the notion that Congress contemplated that easements could be
freely extinguished at the parties’ discretion, as the Belks suggest.
3. State Law
The legislative history also shows that Congress had a clear understanding of
state law governing charitable contributions and intended the tax code to be
consistent with state law. The Belks assert that the two parties to a donated
11

conservation easement are free under state law to agree to substitutions even if the
easement does not authorize substitutions. (See Belk Brief at 9-10, 33). That
assertion is not correct. Donated conservation easements are, by definition,
charitable gifts, and under state law charitable gifts must be administered in
accordance with their terms and purposes. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo 2012-1 (the tax-deductible conservation easements are “restricted
[charitable] gifts” under state law, that is, “contributions conditioned on the use of
a gift in accordance with the donor’s precise directions and limitations.”) (citation
omitted); Carl J. Herzog Found. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 997–98
(Conn. 1997) (“equity will afford protection to a donor to a charitable corporation
in that the attorney general may maintain a suit to compel the property to be held
for the charitable purpose for which it was given”) (quoting Lefkowitz v.
Lebensfeld, 68 A.D. 2d 488, 494-95 (N.Y. 1979)). See also Unif. Conservation
Easement Act, Prefatory Note and § 3 cmt. (2007) (discussing application of
charitable principles to conservation easements); Unif. Trust Code § 414(e), cmt.
(2000) (same). Accordingly, contrary to the Belks’ assertion, the parties to a taxdeductible easement should not be free to engage in substitutions under state law.
Rather, the holder should have a duty to enforce the easement with regard to the
specific property in accordance with its terms.
Congress was well aware of these state law principles when it drafted
12

§ 170(h). At congressional hearings on proposed § 170(h), and in response to
Treasury’s concern that conservation organizations might not properly enforce
easements, nineteen land trusts submitted testimony in which they acknowledged
the status of tax-deductible easements as “charitable grants” and noted the power
and duty of state courts and state attorneys general to enforce such grants. See
Minor Tax Bills: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of H.
Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. 242 (1980) (App. to Testimony of French
and Pickering Creeks Conservation Trust, the Brandywine Conservancy, and other
Conservation Organizations re H.R. 7318 on June 26, 1980). Congress thus
imposed the requirement that a tax-deductible easement constitute a restriction on
use, granted in perpetuity, with regard to a specific parcel of property with the
understanding that the perpetual restriction should be legally binding on both
parties under state law. In other words, Congress anticipated that state law would
be consistent with its intent to provide deductions with respect to conservation
easements that would permanently protect specific properties.3
3

The Belks cite Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, § 4.8(3) to
support their assertion that parties to an easement can freely agree to substitutions,
Belk Brief at 34, n. 6, reflecting a gross misunderstanding of the Restatement’s
position on conservation easements. “Conservation servitudes” are separately
defined in the Restatement and afforded “special protections” given the public
interest and substantial public investment. Restatement § 1.6 cmt. b (2000). Most
importantly, § 7.11 applies a special set of rules that are based on the doctrine of cy
pres and require court approval for modification or termination of conservation
13

4. Partial Interest Status
Considering the history of § 170(h) in a broader context, it is important to
recognize that Congress authorized charitable deductions for conservation
easement donations despite its general distaste for deductions for contributions of
partial interests in property. Donations of partial interests are disfavored because
they often involve abusive arrangements where donors retain extensive control
over the property and the public receives little benefit from the donation. In 1969,
Congress adopted a general prohibition on deductions for contributions of partial
interests, Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201, and it has kept this
general prohibition in place ever since. § 170(f)(3)(A).
Congress made an exception to this general prohibition for easement
donations when it enacted §170(h) in 1980, but it imposed strict limits on the
deduction because of the significant potential for abuse. See Stephen J. Small, The
Federal Tax Law of Conservation Easements § 14.02, 2-2 to -3 (4th ed. 1997) (“As
far as Congress … [was] concerned, a taxpayer who donates an easement continues
to use and enjoy the property, and the requirements for taking an income tax
deduction simply must be tighter to ensure that there is also a significant long-term
servitudes held by governmental or charitable entities. Restatement § 7.11 cmts. b
& c (2000). These special protections are completely inconsistent with the notion
that easement restrictions can be extinguished and replaced at the discretion of the
parties.
14

public benefit associated with the donation.”). The Tax Court’s ruling in Belk
upholds the important limits Congress placed on the deduction to protect against
abuse.
5. Temporary Easements Rejected
The conclusion that Congress never contemplated that easements could float
from one property to another is further supported by the fact that, prior to adopting
the 1980 legislation, Congress briefly experimented with the idea of allowing
deductions for donations of easements that were temporary in nature, but quickly
gave up on the experiment as wasteful of taxpayer dollars and ill-advised as a
matter of conservation policy. The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,
provided the first statutory authority for charitable deductions for conservation
easement donations and authorized deductions for the donation of both perpetual
easements and term easements with a minimum term of 30 years.
Land conservation groups such as The Nature Conservancy expressed
concern that term easements would not effectively promote conservation goals.
They believed term easements would be more likely, in the long run, to lead to the
destruction of natural areas than to their permanent protection. See Stephen J.
Small, The Tax Benefits of Donating Easements on Scenic and Historic Property, 7
Real Est. L.J. 304, 315–16 (1979). They also were concerned that the availability
15

of deductions for term easements would discourage the donation of perpetual
conservation easements. Id. at 304, 306.
Providing a deduction for term easements was also ill-advised from a tax
policy standpoint because it created an expensive subsidy for taxpayers making
long-term investments in land held for eventual development. Under the 1976
legislation, an investor making a 30-year investment in land on the urbanizing
fringe of a metropolitan region could receive a deduction for donating an easement
that would do little or nothing to advance conservation goals, given that the
investor did not intend to develop the land for thirty years in any event. Such a
deduction would merely reduce the carrying costs of this type of investment.
Accordingly, Congress quickly dropped the idea of temporary easements
one year later, in 1977, and established a strict perpetuity requirement. Act of May
23, 1977, Pub. L. 95-30. Congress then stuck to this policy when it enacted
§ 170(h) in 1980 and has abided by it since. The Belks’ request that the Court
interpret § 170(h) as providing a deduction for the donation of temporary
easements runs headlong into Congress’s carefully considered judgment to reject
that option and require permanent protection of specific parcels.
C. Regulations
Finally, the Treasury regulations emphatically support the Commissioner’s
position that tax deductions are not available for contributions of easements that
16

float. The regulations confirm what both the statute and the legislative history
teach: to qualify for a deduction, easement restrictions must permanently attach to
the specific property on which the donor placed the restrictions for the purpose of
claiming the deduction.
In the case of any donation under this section, any interest in the property
retained by the donor (and the donor’s successors in interest) must be
subject to legally enforceable restrictions (for example, by recordation in the
land records in the jurisdiction in which the property is located) that will
prevent uses of the retained interest inconsistent with the conservation
purposes of the donation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(1) (emphases added). The emphasized phrases
demonstrate that, to be eligible for a deduction, the perpetual restrictions that
protect conservation values must attach to the specific property on which the donor
placed the restrictions, not any property anywhere. Thus, the regulations, on their
face, preclude floating easements.
Other provisions of the regulations are consistent with and support this
conclusion. The regulations closely track the advice and direction provided in the
Senate Finance Committee’s report discussed above.
With respect to “transfers,” the regulations pronounce a general rule that “[a]
deduction shall be allowed for a contribution under this section only if in the
instrument of conveyance the donor prohibits the donee from subsequently
transferring the easement … whether or not for consideration.” Treas. Reg.
17

§ 1.170A-14(c)(2). The regulations identify two exceptions to the no-transfer rule.
First, a donee may transfer an easement to another “eligible donee” provided the
donee requires, as a condition of any such transfer, “that the conservation purposes
which the contribution was originally intended to advance continue to be carried
out.” Second, a transfer is allowed in the context of an extinguishment when “a
later unexpected change in the conditions surrounding the property” makes
“impossible or impractical the continued use of the property for conservation
purposes” and “the property is sold and or exchanged and any proceeds are used by
the donee organization in a manner consistent with the conservation purposes of
the original contribution.” The regulations also make clear that such an
extinguishment can only be authorized by “judicial proceeding” and with a
payment of a specified minimum proportionate share of proceeds to the holder.
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6).4
These exceptions, which are the only exceptions to the no-transfer rule,
logically preclude the floating easement theory—that easement restrictions can be
extinguished (i.e., transferred back to the donor or a subsequent owner of the
4

The operative provision governing extinguishment is regulation §1.170A14(g)(6). Regulation §1.170A-14(c)(2) merely provides that an extinguishment
that satisfies the extinguishment regulation requirements will not violate the
restriction-on-transfer requirements. The cross-reference to “(g)(5)(ii)” in the last
sentence of regulation §1.170A-14(c)(2) should be to “(g)(6)(ii).” See Proposed
Regulations §1.170A-13, 48 Fed. Reg. 22941 (May 23, 1983).
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property) and replaced with restrictions on some other property at the parties’
discretion. The first exception allows an easement on a particular piece of property
to be transferred from one eligible donee to another. The second exception permits
an easement to be extinguished and replaced with restrictions on another property
only if continued use of the original property for conservation purposes has
become impossible or impractical due to changed conditions, the extinguishment is
approved by a court, and the holder receives a minimum proportionate share of
proceeds as specified in the extinguishment regulation. The Belks’ interpretation
of § 170(h) would render the restriction-on-transfer and extinguishment regulations
superfluous, contrary to basic rules of construction. See Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).
Other regulatory provisions likewise reinforce the conclusion that the
easement restrictions must apply to a particular property. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) (“the donor must [generally] make available to the donee …
documentation sufficient to establish the condition of the property at the time of
the gift. Such documentation is designed to protect the conservation interests
associated with the property, which although protected in perpetuity by the
easement, could be adversely affected by the exercise of the reserved rights.”)
(emphasis added); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) (“No deduction will be permitted
… for an interest in property which is subject to a mortgage unless the mortgagee
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subordinates its rights in the property to the right of the qualified organization to
enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity.”) (emphasis added);
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(ii) (“the terms of the donation must provide a right
of the donee to enforce the conservation restrictions …, including … the right to
require the restoration of the property to its condition at the time of the donation.”)
(emphasis added).
II.

Neither Simmons Nor Kaufman Supports Tax Deductions for Floating
Easements.
The Belks rely on two decisions involving façade easement donations,

Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and Kaufman v. Shulman, 687
F.3d. 21 (1st Cir. 2012), to support their theory that § 170(h) authorizes deductions
for floating easements. These decisions do not support the Belks.5
Both cases involved donations of façade easements that granted the holder
the right “to give its consent (e.g., to changes in a Façade) or to abandon some or
all of its rights” under the easement. Simmons at 8. In both cases the government
argued that this clause made the taxpayers ineligible for deductions. In both cases
the courts ruled for the taxpayers, with the First Circuit in Kaufman following the
D.C. Circuit’s decision in Simmons.
5

Amici doubt that either Simmons or Kaufman was correctly decided, but the
Court need not resolve that question to conclude that the decisions, neither of
which represents binding precedent in this Circuit, do not provide apposite or
persuasive authority in support of the Belks.
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These cases do not support the Belks’ floating easement theory for several
reasons. First, neither case addressed whether a deduction could be taken for a
floating easement, and neither addressed the qualified real property interest
requirement or the regulations dealing with transfers and extinguishment that are
so significant to the resolution of this case.
Second, the rulings in Simmons and Kaufman were based largely on factors
totally unrelated to this case, including (1) a regulation applicable only to historic
preservation easements that permits deductions if the easements require any future
development to “conform with appropriate local, state, or Federal standards for
construction or rehabilitation,” Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(i), (2) the fact that
the relevant local governments had established such standards, and (3) the fact that
the easements specified that any work done on the subject historic structures had to
comply with such standards, regardless of whether the holder consented. See
Comm’r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See also Simmons v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo 2009-208 at 2. On these special facts, the D.C. Circuit explained, “any
change in the façade to which [the holder] might consent would have to comply
with all applicable laws and regulations, including the District’s historic
preservation laws.” 646 F.3d at 11. Thus, “the donated easements will prevent in
perpetuity any changes to the properties inconsistent with conservation purposes.”
Id.
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By contrast, the regulations applicable to easements other than historic
preservation easements do not permit deductions if the easements require any
future development to conform to appropriate local, state, or Federal standards.
Outside of the historic preservation context, there is no backstop of local, state, or
Federal standards to ensure that any changes to an easement will be consistent with
the protection of the subject property’s conservation values. Thus, the special legal
rules at issue Simmons and Kaufman have no relevance to this case.
Finally, the decision in Simmons makes clear that the D.C. Circuit did not
endorse the notion that conservation easements can be swapped. The court stated
that “[Ms.] Simmons’s deeds in particular make express [the land trust’s] intention
to ensure her properties ‘remain essentially unchanged.’” 646 F.3d. at 10
(emphasis added). The court further explains that “any change in the façade to
which [the land trust] might consent would have to comply with all applicable laws
and regulations, including the District’s historic preservation laws,” and, thus, the
terms of “the donated easements will prevent in perpetuity any changes to the
properties inconsistent with conservation purposes.” Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
These statements indicate that the D.C. Circuit contemplated that the easements
would prevent, in perpetuity, any changes to the particular properties encumbered
by the easements that would be inconsistent with the easements’ conservation
purposes, and not that the easements could be lifted off those properties in the
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discretion of the parties and floated to some new buildings elsewhere.
The Tax Court has repeatedly and appropriately rejected invitations by
taxpayers to interpret Simmons and Kaufman expansively. See Mitchell v.
Comm’r, 138 T.C. No. 16 (2012) (distinguishing Simmons); Mitchell v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo 2013-204 (distinguishing Kaufman); Carpenter v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo 2013-172 (distinguishing Kaufman); Belk v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2013-154
(distinguishing Simmons). Simply put, the holdings in Simmons and Kaufman are
fact-specific and cannot logically be applied to excuse failures to comply with
statutory and regulatory requirements that were not analyzed in those cases.
III.

Adoption of Taxpayer’s Theory Would Foment the Abuse Congress
Sought to Avoid by Requiring that Easements Permanently Restrict
Development of Specific Properties.
Adoption of the Belks’ position would lead to precisely the kind of waste of

taxpayer dollars and anemic conservation benefits that Congress sought to avoid
over thirty years ago when it mandated that tax-deductible conservation easements
protect the conservation values of specific properties in perpetuity.
As discussed, Congress repudiated the idea of granting tax deductions for
temporary conservation easements based on the concern that such an approach
would undermine the goal of conservation and waste taxpayer dollars. The very
evils Congress sought to avoid by closing the temporary-easement loophole would
occur if this Court were to embrace taxpayers’ floating easement theory. Under
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the Belks’ position, any time an easement threatens to serve its intended purpose
by actually constraining the development of land, the donor, with the concurrence
of a willing land trust, could eliminate the constraint by shifting the easement to
some other land not currently slated for development. If at some future time the
relocated easement constricted some new development, that easement could be
relocated to yet another property. And so on ad infinitum. The upshot would be
that the tax benefit provided for the donated easement might ultimately serve no
valuable conservation purpose by actually restricting development. While the
Belks propose to place substitute restrictions on contiguous land they own, there is
nothing in their theory that would require such a limitation.
To be sure, at all times a legal restriction would rest someplace on the
landscape, providing theoretical protection of conservation values. But since the
restrictions could be moved out of the way of proposed development at any time to
suit the interests of the landowner, the tax subsidy would, in reality, provide little
or no public benefit in exchange for the tax expenditure.
In addition, the conservation benefits associated with easements would be
severely compromised if easement restrictions could be moved about the
landscape. Under the terms of the Belks’ easement, restrictions on the substitute
property would supposedly have equivalent economic and conservation value to
the easement restrictions being lifted. But this type of equivalence would
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inevitably be in the eyes of the beholder. There would be a serious risk that the
substitute easement would have less public value than the original easement.
While the original charitable donor might have an incentive to try to create a
substitute easement of equivalent conservation and economic value, there is no
reason to suppose subsequent owners would have the same proclivities and, in fact,
the opposite would likely be true.
Moreover, transferability of easement restrictions as the Belks suggest
would severely undermine the statutory and regulatory requirements governing the
deduction, which are designed to ensure that only “unique or otherwise significant
land areas or structures” receive conservation subsidies and that the conservation
values of those properties are protected in perpetuity. To make an easement
contribution eligible for a deduction, the taxpayer must, among many other things,
prepare “baseline” documentation of the status of the property at the time of the
donation to facilitate enforcement, see Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i), obtain a
subordination agreement from any lender holding a mortgage on the property to
protect the easement from extinguishment in a foreclosure, see Treas. Reg. §
1.170A-14(g)(2), and comply with detailed conservation easement-specific
valuation rules, see Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3). Under the floating easement
theory, new restrictions imposed on new properties would be created in a vacuum
in which none of these or any other statutory and regulatory requirements would
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apply. In addition, none of the indirect policing that occurs as part of the Internal
Revenue Service’s tax return review and audit process in connection with the
original easement donations would apply. Congress could not have intended to
make compliance with § 170(h)’s detailed statutory and regulatory requirements at
the time of donation a pointless exercise by allowing compliant restrictions to be
traded out for restrictions that are not subject to the same strict requirements the
following day.
The Belks assert that the public interest is protected because the substitutions
require the concurrence of the land trust. But Congress specifically did not grant
the qualified organizations eligible to accept easement donations the power to
engage in substitutions. Instead, Congress mandated that easements be granted in
perpetuity with respect to specific properties and that the qualified organizations
be, among other things (1) required to hold the easements exclusively for
conservation purposes and (2) prohibited from transferring the easements except to
other qualified organizations that also will hold them exclusively for conservation
purposes. S. Rep. No. 96-1007, C.B. 599, at 606 (1980-82). Because of the
significant potential for abuse in this partial interest donation context, Congress
demanded far more protection of what has grown to be a multi-billion dollar
federal taxpayer investment than the holders’ status as qualified organizations.
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IV. Adoption of Taxpayer’s Position Would Transform the Traditional
Understanding of Tax Deductible Perpetual Easements.
Adoption of the Belks’ position would transform taxpayer-subsidized land
conservation as it has long been practiced and understood in the United States.
Landowners have donated thousands of conservation easements to ensure perpetual
protection of specific lands that have special personal significance to them, their
families, and their communities. The Nature Conservancy, the nation’s largest
land trust, explains:
Often landowners have no intention of subdividing their properties for
development. But a conservation easement is still attractive to them because
it reaches beyond their own lifetimes to ensure the conservation purposes are
met forever. An easement binds heirs and other future landowners to comply
with the easement’s terms…. It can give peace-of-mind to current
landowners worried about the future of a beloved property, whether forest or
ranch, stretch of river or family farm.
Conservation Easements, In Perpetuity, http://www.nature.org/about-us/privatelands-conservation/conservation-easements/all-about-conservation-easements.xml.
In a similar vein, the Jackson Hole Land Trust explains:
Easements are donated or sold by the landowner to the land trust, which then
has the authority and obligation to enforce the terms of the easement in
perpetuity. When a parcel of land is placed under easement, the landowner
still owns the property, which remains freely transferable, but the easement
stays with the land forever.
Conserve Your Land, http://jhlandtrust.org/land-protection/conserve-your-land/.
And, on the other side of the country, the Vermont Land Trust explains:
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With each conservation success comes a deep and permanent responsibility:
we have promised to look after, or steward, the conservation protections
placed on this land forever.
Stewardship: A Perpetual Commitment to Conservation, http://www.vlt.org/landstewardship.
Assurances of perpetual protection of specific parcels of land have served as
a powerful incentive in the growth of the land conservation movement in the
United States over the last several decades. Amici submit that the preservation of
this traditional understanding of the nature of the perpetual conservation easement
is essential to protect both the legitimate expectations of conservation easement
donors and the substantial public investment in tax deductible easements.
The Belks argue that the Tax Court’s interpretation of § 170(h)(2)(C) to
preclude a deduction for floating easements is “novel, overbroad, and
unsupported.” (Belk Brief at 14). However, it is the Belks’ interpretation that fits
that description. It is not surprising that some landowners and even some land
trusts may seek to take advantage of the federal subsidies for land conservation
while avoiding the conditions attached to these subsidies to protect the public
interest. The importance of this case lies in the fact that the Court’s ruling will
either arrest this destructive, ill-advised line of thinking, or greatly accelerate its
adoption and implementation.
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As conservation easements age and properties change hands, new owners
will commonly find themselves in a situation of conflict with the holders of the
easements. New owners of easement-encumbered land will often have a strong
economic interest in seeking to free themselves of the constraints imposed by the
easements. Under current law, a responsible land trust presented with a proposal to
lift easement restrictions from one property in exchange for placing an easement
on some other land has a ready answer: such a transfer is prohibited by § 170(h)
and the governing regulations. But if this Court were to reverse the Tax Court’s
decision, even well-meaning land trusts would be subject to relentless pressure
from landowners seeking to lift easement restrictions in exchange for the
protection of ostensibly equivalent land in unsupervised and unregulated
transactions. Both the cause of land conservation and the American taxpayer
would end up the losers.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Amici urge the Court to affirm the Tax Court’s
well–reasoned decision.
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